Decrypt ciphertext and return the original plaintext.
Compute a cryptographic hash digest.
Derive a key from a password using a KDF algorithm. The server enforces OWASP floors: scrypt N = 2^17 with r = 8, PBKDF2 at least 600,000 iterations.
Optionalsalt?: stringOptionalkeyLength?: numberDerived key length in bytes (16 to 64).
Optionalparams?: { N?: number; r?: number; p?: number; iterations?: number; info?: string }OptionalN?: numberscrypt cost (only 131072 is accepted).
Optionalr?: numberscrypt block size (only 8 is accepted).
Optionalp?: numberscrypt parallelism (1 to 4).
Optionaliterations?: numberPBKDF2 iterations (600,000 to 1,000,000).
Optionalinfo?: stringHKDF info string.
Compute an HMAC with a hex key.
Verify an HMAC.
Hash a password with Argon2id. The server requires at least two passes and 19456 KiB of memory.
Verify a password against a stored Argon2id hash.
Generate a server-held key pair. Returns its keyId and public key;
the private key stays on the server.
Optionalparams: { algorithm?: KeyAlgorithm; metadata?: KeyMetadata }Export a server-held key, private parts included. Needs the
crypto:keys:export scope, which crypto:admin does not imply.
Sign a message with a server-held Ed25519 key.
Verify an Ed25519 signature against a public key.
Generate a server-held ML-KEM key pair (512, 768, or 1024; default 768).
Encapsulate a shared secret to an ML-KEM public key (512, 768, or 1024).
Recover an ML-KEM shared secret with a server-held key.
Generate a server-held hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM key pair.
Encapsulate a shared secret using hybrid KEM.
Recover a hybrid KEM shared secret with a server-held key.
Sign with a server-held ML-DSA key (FIPS 204); the level comes from the key.
Verify an ML-DSA signature.
Generate a server-held ML-DSA key pair.
Sign with a server-held SLH-DSA key (FIPS 205); the variant comes from the key.
Verify an SLH-DSA signature.
Generate a server-held SLH-DSA key pair.
Seal plaintext with symmetric authenticated encryption (XChaCha20-Poly1305).
Open a secretbox; data is the recovered plaintext.
Seal plaintext to an X25519 public key (anonymous sender).
Open a sealed box with a server-held x25519 key; data is the plaintext.
Seal plaintext to a hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 public key pair.
Open a hybrid sealed box with a server-held hybrid key; data is the plaintext.
Encrypt plaintext using hybrid post-quantum STREAM (X25519 + ML-KEM-768 + XChaCha20-Poly1305).
Decrypt hybrid post-quantum STREAM ciphertext using a server-held hybrid key.
Encrypt plaintext for multiple recipients using hybrid post-quantum STREAM.
Decrypt multi-recipient hybrid post-quantum STREAM ciphertext using a server-held hybrid key.
Encrypt plaintext with a password (Argon2id + XChaCha20-Poly1305).
Decrypt a payload from passwordEncrypt (its encrypted field);
data is the plaintext.
Generate an HPKE key pair (classical or post-quantum hybrid).
Seal (encrypt) a message using HPKE.
Open (decrypt) an HPKE ciphertext using a server-held key.
Wrap (encrypt) a key with a key-encryption key.
Unwrap a wrapped key; data is the hex-encoded key.
Create a managed key via KMS provider.
Wrap (encrypt) an existing key using a managed KMS key.
Unwrap a wrapped key using a managed KMS key.
Generate a Data Encryption Key (DEK) via KMS provider.
Encrypt plaintext data using a managed KMS key.
Decrypt ciphertext using a managed KMS key.
Fetch the DORA Article 9 & 13 self-assessment.
Fetch the CycloneDX 1.6 Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM). The
route returns the CycloneDX document itself, not wrapped in { data }.
Evaluates network constraints, MTU limits, and regulatory security levels to negotiate the optimal post-quantum or composite hybrid cryptographic algorithm.
List all supported algorithms by category.
Check API server health (a public route: no credentials are sent).
Encrypt plaintext with XChaCha20-Poly1305 under a 256-bit hex key.